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1. CLASSICAL COGNITIVISM, CONNECTIONISM AND MENTAL STATES. 
My goal in the present treatment is to sketch and compare two scientific approaches to 
understanding the mind. The first approach, that of classical cognitivism, depicts mind as a 
manipulator of chunky, quite high-level, symbols. The second approach, that of 
connectionism (Artificial Neural Networks, Parallel Distributed Processing) depicts mind 
as a product of the complex interactions between multiple so-called sub-symbolic elements. 
I shall try to clarify this contrast by associating classical cognitivism with the development 
of what I shall call semantically transparent systems, and connectionism with the deliberate 
eschewal of this strategy. Connectionism, I then argue, represents a subtle twist on the 
standard philosophical view of mental states as functional states. For it suggests a kind of 
microfunctionalism in which the inner roles do not map neatly onto roles determined by our 
everyday, contentful, purposive characterizations of the mental. (For the reader unfamiliar 
with some of these terms, such as functionalism, sub-symbolic, etc. -- don=t worry: these 
will be explained as we go along). 
2. BACKDROP: TURING, MCCARTHY, NEWELL, AND SIMON. 
The bigger the names, the harder they drop. These would dent the kinds of floors that 
supported ancient mainframes. It would be fair to say that Turing made AI conceivable, and 
McCarthy (along with Minsky, Newell, and Simon) made it possible. Despite occasional 
pronouncements to the contrary, I think we are still waiting to see it made actual, but more 
on that in due course. 
Turing's (1937) achievement was to formalize the notion of computation itself, using 
the theoretical device we call a Turing machine. He thereby paved the way for 
mathematical investigations of computability. But significantly, Turing's formalization also 
1) encompassed a whole class of mechanisms grouped together not by details of actual 
physical composition but by their formal properties of symbol manipulation, 2) showed 
how such mechanisms could tackle any sufficiently well specified problem that would 
normally require human intelligence to solve, and 3) showed how to define a special kind 
of Turing machine (the universal Turing machine) which could imitate any other Turing 
machine and thus perform any cognitive task that any other Turing machine could perform. 
I shall not review the details of Turing's demonstrations here1. For present purposes what 
matters is that Turing's ideas suggested the notion of machines that, by their formal 
structure, imitate (and even emulate) the mind. The material stuff (valves, silicon, or 
whatever) did not matter; the formal properties guaranteed in principle a capacity to 
perform any sufficiently well specified cognitive task. In the words of one major figure: 
                                                 
1 See Turing (1937) (1950). For thorough summaries see Haugeland (1985), Hodges 
(1983). 
Turing's work can be seen as the first study of cognitive activity fully abstracted in 
principle from both biological and phenomenological foundations.... It represents the 




                                                
spirit. It makes possible a science of structure and function divorced from material 
substance.... Because it speaks the language of mental structures and internal 
processes, it can answer questions traditionally posed by psychologists (Pylyshyn, 
1986, p. 68). 
Classical cognitivism, thanks to the work of Turing, was on the cards. It was some 
time, however, before it could develop into a viable, experimental discipline. That 
development required first the arrival of the general-purpose digital computer and second 
the availability of a powerful and flexible high-level programming language. John von 
Neumann provided the practical design, and John McCarthy, around 1960, provided a 
language. The language was called LISP, which stood for list processing, and it made 
possible the first sustained run of research and development within the classical-cognitivist 
paradigm2. This run of research and development became theoretically self-conscious and 
articulate with Newell & Simon's abstraction of the notion of a physical symbol system. 
 
2 In fact, the idea of list processing (in which data structures contain symbols that point to 
other data structures, which likewise contain symbols that point to other data structures and so 




                                                                                                                                                    
3. THE PHYSICAL-SYMBOL-SYSTEM HYPOTHESIS. 
 
Newell and Herbert Simon in their program Logic Theorist of 1956. For a detailed treatment of 
list processing see Charniak & McDermott (1985) Ch. 2, and also Newell & Simon (1976). One 
attractive and important feature of LISP was its universal function eval, which made it as 
adaptable as a universal Turing machine, barring constraints of actual memory space in any 
implementation. 
A physical symbol system, according to Newell & Simon (1976, p. 40-42) is any member of 
a general class of physically realizable systems meeting the following conditions: 
1) It contains a set of symbols, which are physical patterns that can be strung together 
to yield a structure (or expression). 
2) It contains a multitude of such symbol structures and a set of processes that 
operate on them (creating, modifying, reproducing and destroying them according to 
instructions, themselves coded as symbol structures). 
3) It is located in a wider world of real objects and may be related to that world by 
designation (in which the behavior of the system affects or is otherwise consistently 
related to the behavior or state of the object) or interpretation (in which expressions 
in the system designate a process, and when the expression occurs, the system is able 




In effect, a physical symbol system is any system in which suitably manipulable tokens can 
be assigned arbitrary meanings and, by means of careful programming, can be relied on to 
behave in ways consistent (to some specified degree) with this projected semantic content. 
Any general-purpose computer constitutes such a system. What, though, is the relation 
between such systems and the phenomena of mind (hoping, fearing, knowing, believing, 
planning, seeing, recognizing, and so on)? Newell & Simon are commendably explicit once 
again. Such an ability to manipulate symbols, they suggest, is the scientific essence of 
thought and intelligence, much as H20 is the scientific essence of water. According to the 
physical-symbol-system hypothesis, the necessary and sufficient condition for a physical 
system to exhibit general intelligent action is that it be a physical symbol system, Newell & 
Simon thus claim that any generally intelligent physical system will be a physical system 
(the necessity claim) and that any physical symbol system can be organized further to 
exhibit general intelligent action (the sufficiency claim). And general, intelligent action, on 
Newell & Simon=s gloss, implies the same scope of intelligence seen in human action. 
It is important to be as clear as possible about the precise nature of Newell & Simon's 
claim. As they themselves point out (1976, p. 42), there is a weak (and incorrect) reading of 
their ideas that asserts simply that a physical symbol system is (or can be) a universal 
machine capable of any well-specified computation, that the essence of intelligence lies in 
computation, and that intelligence could therefore be realized by a universal machine (and 
hence by a physical symbol system). The trouble with this reading is that by leaving the 
nature of the computations involved so unspecified, it asserts rather too little to be of 
immediate psychological interest. Newell and Simon rather intend the physical-symbol-
system hypothesis as a specific architectural assertion about the nature of intelligent 
systems (1976, p. 42, my emphasis). It is fair, if a little blunt, to render this specific 




The strong-physical-symbol-system (SPSS) hypothesis. A virtual machine engaging in 
the von Neumann-style manipulation of standard symbolic atoms has the direct and 
necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action. 
It will be necessary to say a little about the terms of this hypothesis and then to justify its 
ascription to Newell and Simon. 
About the terms, I note the following.  A virtual machine is a "machine" that owes its 
existence solely to a program that runs (perhaps with other intervening stages) on a real, 
physical machine and causes it to imitate the usually more complex machine to which we 
address our instructions (see, for example Sloman, 1984).  Such high-level programming- 
languages as LISP, PROLOG, and POP11 thus define virtual machines.  And a universal 
Turing machine, when it simulates a special-purpose Turing machine, may be treated as a 
virtual version of the special-purpose machine. 
"Von Neumann-style manipulation is meant to suggest the use of certain basic 
manipulatory operations easily provided in a Von Neumann machine running a high-level 
language like LISP.  Such operations would include assigning symbols, binding variables, 
copying, reading and amending symbol strings, basic syntactic, pattern-matching 
operations (more on which later), and so on.  Connectionist processing, as we shall see, 
involves a radically different repertoire of primitive operations. 
The next phrase to consider is "standard symbolic atoms." This highlights what kinds 
of entities the SPSS approach defines its computational operations to apply to.  They are to 
apply to symbolic expressions whose parts (atoms) are capable of being given an exact 
semantic interpretation in terms of the concepts and relations familiar to us in daily, or at 
any rate public, language.  These are words (atoms) such as "table," "ball," "loves,"orbit," 
"electron," and so forth.  Some styles of connectionism and a few more conventional 




standard symbolic atoms.  Since this contrast looms quite large in what follows, it will be 
expanded upon in section 5 below. 
Finally, the locution "direct and necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent 
action" is intended to capture a claim of architectural sufficiency.  In effect, the claim is 
that a strong physical symbol system, as just defined, will be immediately capable of 
genuine intelligent action.  That is, such a machine could be truly intelligent quite 
independently of any particular architectures (any other real or virtual machines on which it 
is built), and conversely, it could be so without simulating any other architectures or 
machines.  The SPSS hypothesis thus makes a highly specific and laudably Popperian 
claim. 
What evidence is there to associate such a claim with Newell and Simon? Quite a lot.  
Some of the evidence comes in the form of reasonably explicit assertions.  Some can be 
inferred from the details of their actual work in AI.  And some (for what it is worth) can be 
found in the opinions of other commentators and critics.  A brief review of some of this 
evidence follows.  It is perhaps worth noting that even if Newell and Simon were to deny 
any commitment to the SPSS hypothesis, the formulation would still serve our purposes, 
since something like that hypothesis informs the philosophers' view of artificial intelligence 
and without doubt, still informs (perhaps unconsciously) a great deal of work within AI 
itself. 
4. BRINGING HOME THE BACON. 
Still, a little evidence never goes amiss.  For a start, we find the following comment 
sandwiched between Newell and Simon's outline of the nature of a physical symbol system 
and their explicit statement of the hypothesis: "The type of system we have just defined ... 
bears a strong family resemblance to all general purpose computers.  If a symbol-
manipulation language, such as LISP, is taken as defining a machine, then the kinship 




                                                
664), who takes issue with the idea that baroque manipulations of standard LISP atoms 
could constitute the essence of intelligence and thought, is happy to ascribe just that view to 
Newell and Simon. 
Moreover, Newell and Simon's own practice does seem to bear such an ascription 
out.  Thus, all their work, from the early General Problem Solver (1963) to their more 
recent work on production systems3 and on automating scientific creativity, has been 
guided by the notion of serial heuristic search based on protocols, notebook records, and 
observation of human subjects. (Heuristic search is a means of avoiding the expensive and 
often practically impossible systematic search of an entire problem space by using rules of 
thumb to lead you quickly to the area in which with a little luck the solution is to be found.) 
For our purposes, the things that most significantly characterize this work (and much other 
work in contemporary AI besides -- see, for example, the AM program mentioned below) 
are its reliance on a serial application of rules or heuristics, the rather high-level, 
consciously introspectable grain of most of the heuristics involved, and the nature of the 
chosen-task domains. I shall try to make these points dearer by looking at the example of 
BACON and some of its successors, a series of programs that aim to simulate and explain 
 
3 A production system is essentially a set of if-then pairs in which the if specifies a 
condition that, if satisfied, causes an action (the then) to be performed. Each if-then pair or 





                                                
the process of scientific discovery (Langley (1979); Simon (1979) (1987); Langley, et al. 
(1987)). 
BACON sets out to induce scientific laws from bodies of data.  It takes observations 
of the values of variables and searches for functions relating the values of the different 
variables.  Along the way it may introduce new variables standing for the ratio of the value 
of the original variables.  When it finds an invariant, a constant relation of the values of 
different variables, it has (in some sense) discovered a scientific law.  Thus, by following 
simple heuristics of the kind a person might use to seek relations among the data ("try the 
simple relations first," "treat nonconstant products of ratios between variables as new 
variables," etc.), BACON was able to generate from Kepler's data "ratios of [successive] 
powers of the radii of the planets' orbits to [successive] powers of their periods of 
revolution, arriving at the invariant D3/P2 (Kepler's third law), after a search of a small 
number of possibilities," (Simon (1979), p. 1088).  Similarly, BACON arrived at Ohms law 
by noticing that the product of electrical current and resistance is a constant. 
Now for a few comments on BACON. First, BACON makes its discoveries by 
working on data presented in notational formats (e.g., measures of resistance, periods of 
planetary revolution) that represent the fruits of centuries of human labor. Manipulating 
these representations could be the tip of the iceberg; creating them and understanding them 
may constitute the unseen bulk. I say a little more about this later. 
For now, simply note that BACON and other programs like AM and EURISKO4, and 
MYCIN (below) help themselves to our high-level representational formalism.  In a recent 
 
4 The AM program, as Lenat himself later pointed out, worked partly due to the amount 
of mathematical knowledge implicit in LISP, the language in which it was written (see Lenat 
(1983a) (1983b), Lenat & Brown (1984), Ritchie & Hanna (1984)). This result seems related to 
the observations concerning the amount of the work of scientific discovery already done by 
giving BACON data arranged in our representational notation. Lenat=s later work, EURISKO 
avoids the Adefect@ of trading on the quasi-mathematical nature of LISP. But it too relies on 




work Langley et al. (1987), p. 326) are sensitive to the problem of creating new 
representational formalisms.  But they insist that such problems can be solved within the 
architectural paradigm associated with the SPSS hypothesis. 
Second and relatedly, the knowledge and heuristics that BACON deploys are coded 
rather directly from the level of thought at which we consciously introspect about our own 
thinking.  This is evident from Simon's (1987) statement that he relies heavily on human 
protocols, laboratory notebooks, etc.  BACON thus simulates, in effect, the way we reason 
when we are conscious of trying to solve a problem and it uses kinds of heuristics that with 
some effort we might explicitly formulate and use as actual, practical rules of thumb. This 
level of modeling is common to much but not all contemporary work in AI, including work 
in expert systems and qualitative reasoning (see, e.g., the section "Reasoning about the 
Physical World@ in Hallam & Mellish (1987)). Thus the MYCIN rule (Shortliffe (1976)) 
for blood injections reads: If (1) the site of the culture is blood, (2) the gram stain of the 
organism is gramneg, (3) the morphology of the organism rod, and (4) the patient is a 
compromised host, then there is suggestive evidence that the identity of the organism is 
pseudomonasaeruginosa (from Feigenbaum (1977), p. 1014). 
Likewise, BACON's representation of data was at the level of attribute-value pairs, 
with numerical values for the attributes.  The general character of the modeling is even 
more apparent in programs for qualitative discovery: GLAUBER and STAHL. GLAUBER 
applies heuristic rules to data expressed at the level of predicate-argument notation, e.g., 
reacts [inputs (HCl, NH3) outputs (NH4, Cl)]," and STAHL deploys such heuristics as 
"identify components: If a is composed of b and c, and a is composed of b and d, and 
neither c contains d nor d contains c, then identify c with d." 
Third, BACON uses fairly slow serial search, applying its heuristics one at a time and 
assessing the results.  Insofar as BACON relies on productions, there is an element of 




a time, and this is the seriality I have in mind.  Serial behavior of this kind is characteristic 
of slow, conscious thought.  And Hofstadter (1985), p. 632) reports Simon as asserting, 
"Everything of interest in cognition happens above the 100 millisecond level -- the time it 
takes you to recognize your mother." Hofstadter disagrees vehemently, asserting that 
everything of interest in cognition takes place below the 100 millisecond level.  My 
position, outlined below, is sympathetic to Hofstadter's (and indeed owes a great deal to it).  
But I believe that the notion of a dispute over the correct level of interest here is misplaced. 
There are various explanatory projects here, all legitimate.  Some require us to go below 
the 100-millisecond level (or whatever) while others do not.  This relates, in a way I expand 
on later, to a problem area cited by Simon in a recent lecture (1987); see also Langley, et al. 
(1987), p. 14-16).  Simon notes that programs like BACON are not good at very ill 
structured tasks, tasks demanding a great deal of general knowledge and expectations.  
Thus, though BACON neatly arrives at Kepler's third law when given the well-structured 
task of finding the invariants in the data, it could not come up with the flash of insight by 
which Fleming could both see that the mold on his petri dish was killing surrounding 
bacteria and recognize this as an unusual and potentially interesting event. 
Listening to Simon, one gets the impression that he believes the way to solve these un-
structured problems is to expand the set of high-level data and heuristics that a system 
manipulates in the normal, slow, serial way (i.e., by creating, modifying, and comparing 
high-level symbol strings according to stored rules).  Thus, in a recent coauthored book he 
dismisses the idea that the processes involved in the flash-of-insight type of discovery 
might be radically different in computational kind, saying that the speed and subconscious 
nature of such events "does not in any way imply that the process is fundamentally 
different from other processes of discovery- that we must seek for other sources of 
evidence about its nature (i.e., subjects' introspections can no longer help)" (Langley et al. 




The position I develop holds rather that the folk-psychological term "scientific 
discovery" encompasses at least two quite different kinds of processes.  One is a steady, 
Von Neumann-style manipulation of standard symbolic atoms in a search for patterns of 
regularity.  And this is well modeled in Simon and Langley's work.  The other is the flash-
of-insight type of recognition of something unusual and interesting.  And this, I shall 
suggest, may require modeling by a method quite different (though still computational). 
In effect, theorists such as Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, and Zytkow are betting that all 
aspects of human thought will turn out to be dependent on a single kind of computational 
architecture.  That is an architecture in which data is manipulated by the copying, 
reorganizing, and pattern matching capabilities deployed on list structures by a Von 
Neumann (serial) processor.  The basic operations made available in such a setup define the 
computational architecture it is.  Thus, the pattern matching operations which such theorists 
are betting on are the relatively basic ones available in such cases (i.e., test for complete 
syntactic identity, test for syntactic identity following variable substitution, and so on).  
Other architectures (for example, the PDP architecture discussed later) provide different 
basic operations.  In the case of parallel distributed processing these include a much more 
liberal and flexible pattern-matching capacity able to find a best match in cases where the 
standard SPSS approach would find no match at all. 
Langley, Simon, et al. are explicit about their belief that the symbol processing 
architecture they investigate has the resources to model and explain all the aspects of 
human thought.  Faced with the worry that the approach taken by BACON, DALTON, 
GLAUBER, and STAHL won't suffice to explain all the psychological processes that make 
up scientific discovery, they write, "Our hypothesis is that the other processes of scientific 
discovery, taken one by one, have [the] same character, so that programs for discovering 
research problems, for designing experiments, for designing instruments and for 




information processes that are used in BACON" (1987),p. 114).  They make similar 
comments concerning the question of mental imagery (p. 336).  This insistence on a single 
architecture of thought may turn out to be misplaced.  The alternative is to view mind as a 
complex system comprising many virtual architectures.  If this is true, psychological 
explanation will likewise need to deal in a variety of types of models, availing itself in each 
case of different sets of basic operations (relative to the virtual architecture). 
Finally, a word about the methodology of BACON and its classical cognitivist cousins.  
These programs characteristically attempt to model fragments of what we might term 
recent human achievements.  By this I mean they focus on tasks that we intelligent, 
language-using human beings perform (or at least think we perform) largely by conscious 
and deliberate efforts.  Such tasks tend to be well structured in the sense of having definite 
and recognizable goals to be achieved by deploying a limited set of tools (e.g., games and 
puzzles with prescribed legal moves, theorem proving, medical diagnosis, cryparithmetic 
and so on).  They also tend to be the tasks we do slowly and badly in comparison with 
perceptual and sensorimotor tasks, which we generally do quickly and fluently.  Some AI 
workers are dubious about this choice of task domain and believe it essential to tackle the 
fluent, unconscious stuff first before going on to model more evolutionarily recent 
achievements.  Marr (1977), p. 140) gives the classic statement of this: "Problem-solving 
research has tended to concentrate on problems that we understand well intellectually but 
perform poorly on.... I argue that [there are] exceptionally good grounds for not studying 
how we carry out such tasks yet.  I have no doubt that when we do (e.g.) mental arithmetic 
we are doing something well, but it is not arithmetic and we seem far from understanding 
even one component of what that something is.  Let us therefore concentrate on the simpler 
problems first.  I have expressed similar views based on direct evolutionary arguments 
(Clark (1986)).  There still seems to me to be much truth in such strictures.  But the overall 




5. SEMANTICALLY TRANSPARENT SYSTEMS. 
It is time to expand on the notion of a standard symbolic atom, introduced in section 3 
above.  One of the most theoretically interesting points of contrast between classical 
systems (as understood by philosophers like Fodor and Pylyshyn) and connectionist 
systems (as understood by theorists like Smolensky) concerns the precise sense in which 
the former rely on, and the latter eschew, the use of such symbolic atoms.  To bring out 
what is at issue here, I shall speak of the classicist as (by definition) making a 
methodological commitment to the construction of semantically transparent systems.  
Credit for the general idea of semantic transparency (though not the label) belongs 
elsewhere.  The analysis I offer is heavily influenced by ideas in Smolensky 1988. Thus let 
us say that:  
A system will be said to be semantically transparent just in case it is possible to 
describe a neat mapping between a symbolic (conceptual level) semantic description of 
the system's behavior and some projectible semantic interpretation of the internally 
represented objects of its formal computational activity. 
The general notion of a semantically transparent system (STS) may be best appreciated 
from the perspective offered by Marr=s now-standard account of the levels of 
understanding of an information-processing task.  Marr (1982) distinguishes three levels at 
which a machine carrying out an information-processing task needs to be understood. 
Level 1, computational theory.  This level describes the goal of the computation, the 
general strategies for achieving it, and the constraints on such strategies. 
Level 2, representation and algorithm.  This describes an algorithm, i.e., a series of 
computational steps that does the job.  It also includes details of the way the inputs and 
outputs are to be represented to enable the algorithm to perform the transformation. 
Level 3, implementation.  This shows how the computation may be given flesh (or 




                                                
In short, level 1 considers what function is being computed (at a high level of abstraction), 
level 2 finds a way to compute it, and level 3 shows how that way can be realized in the 
physical universe. 
Suppose that at level I you describe a task by using the conceptual apparatus of public 
language. (This is not compulsory at level 1 but is often the case.) You might use such 
words as “liquid,” “flow,” “edge,” and so on.  You thus describe the function to be 
computed in terms proper to what Paul Smolensky calls the conceptual level, the level of 
public language.  Very roughly, a system will count as an STS if the computational objects 
of its algorithmic description (level 2) are isomorphic to its task-analytic description 
couched in conceptual level terms (level 1).  What this means is that the computational 
operations specified by the algorithm are applied to internal representations that are 
projectibly5 interpretable as standing for conceptual-level entities.  
Some examples may help to sharpen these levels.  Consider the following 
specifications of functions to be computed. 
(1) If (cup and saucer) then (cup) 
If (cup and saucer) then (saucer) 
(2) If (verb stem + ending) then (verb stem + ed) 
The functions in (1) are clear examples of a conceptual level specification.  Though (2) 
does not draw on daily language, it is nonetheless a related case. In each case the items in 
parentheses are structural descriptions whose structure is semantically significant. 
 




A semantically transparent system, we may now say, is one in which the objects (e.g., 
"cup and saucer) of state-transition rules in the task analysis (e.g., the rule "if (cup and 
saucer) then (cup)") have structural analogues in the actual processing story told at level 2. 
That is to say, in the case of (1), the level 2 story will involve computational operations 
defined to apply to representations sharing the complex structure of the expression "cup 
and saucer." In the case of (2), the level 2 story will involve computational operations 
defined to apply to descriptions of input verbs in a way that reveals them to have the 
structure "verb stem + ending." It is in this sense that classical, semantically transparent 
systems may be said to have a certain kind of syntax.  For they posit mental representations 
that have actual structures echoing the semantic structures of our level-I description.  As 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) forcibly point out, this is very handy if we want our system to 
perform systematically with respect to a certain semantic description.  For it has the effect 
of making the semantic description a real object for the system.  Hence, any inferences, 
etc., that are systematic in the semantic description can easily be mimicked by relying on 
the syntactic properties of its internal representations.  If we want our system to treat "(cup 
and saucer)" as an instance of a general logical schema "(a and b)" and hence to perform all 
kinds of deductive inferences on arguments involving cups and saucers, this will be a 
simple matter just so long as the system's representation of cups and saucers is semantically 
transparent and preserves structure. 
Clearly, the notion of a semantically transparent system is intended to capture the 
substance of Fodor and Pylyshyn's definition of a classical approach to cognitive science.  
Classical and connectionist approaches differ, according to Fodor and Pylyshyn, in two 
vital respects. 
(1) AClassical theories -- but not connectionist theories -- posit a "language of 
thought". This means that they posit mental representations (data structures) with a 




systematically built by combining atomic constituents into molecular assemblies, 
which (in complex cases) make up whole data structures in turn.  In short, they posit 
symbol systems with a combinatorial syntax and semantics. 
(2) "In classical models, the principles by which mental states are transformed, or 
by which an input selects the corresponding output, are defined over structural 
properties of mental representations.  Because classical mental representations have 
combinatorial structure, it is possible for classical mental operations to apply to 
them by reference to their form." This means that if you have a certain kind of 
structured representations available (as demanded by point 1), it is possible to 
define computational operations on those representations so that the operations are 
sensitive to that structure.  If the structure isn't there (i.e., if there is no symbolic 
representation), you couldn't to it, though you might make it look as if you had by 
fixing on a suitable function in extension. (Quotes are from Fodor and Pylyshyn 
(1988), p. 12-13.) 
In short, a classical system is one that posits syntactically structured, symbolic 
representations and that defines its computational operations to apply to such 
representations in virtue of their structure. 
The notion of a semantically transparent system is also meant to capture the spirit of 
Smolensky's views on the classical/connectionist divide, as evidenced in comments like the 
following:  
A symbolic model is a system of interacting processes, all with the same 
conceptual-level semantics as the task behavior being explained.  Adopting the 
terminology of Haugeland (1978), this systematic explanation relies on a systematic 
reduction of the behavior that involves no shift of semantic domain or dimension.  
Thus a game-playing program is composed of subprograms that generate possible 




reductions play the major role in explanation.  The lowest level processes in the 
systematic reduction, still with the original semantics of the task domain, are then 
themselves reduced by intentional instantiation: they are implemented exactly by 
other processes with different semantics but the same form.  Thus a move-
generation subprogram with game semantics is instantiated in a system of programs 
with list-manipulating semantics. (Smolensky (1988), p. 11) 
Before leaving the subject of STSs, it is worth pausing to be quite explicit about one 
factor that is not intended as part of the definition of an STS. Under the terms of the 
definition an STS theorist is not committed to any view of how the system explicitly 
represents the rules adduced in task analysis (level 1).  Thus, in my example (1), there is no 
suggestion that the rule 'If (cup and saucer) then (cup)" must itself be explicitly represented 
by the machine.  A system could be an STS and be hard-wired so as to take the input "cup 
and saucer" and transform it into the output "cup." According to STS theory, all that must 
be explicit is the structured description of the objects to which the rule is defined to apply.  
The derivation rules may be tacit, so long as the data structures they apply to are explicit.  
On this Fodor and Pylyshyn rightly insist: "Classical machines can be rule implicit with 
respect to their programs.... What does need to be explicit in a classical machine is not its 
program but the symbols that it writes on its tapes (or stores in its registers).  These, 
however, correspond not to the machine's rules of state transition but to its data structures" 
(1988), p. 61).  As an example they point out that the grammar posited by a linguistic 
theory need not be explicitly represented in a classical machine.  But the structural 
descriptions of sentences over which the grammar is defined (e.g., in terms of verb stems, 
subordinate clauses, etc.) must be.  Attempts to characterize the classical/ connectionist 





It is now time to introduce a major and more straight-forwardly philosophical protagonist, 
the functionalist.  The functionalist is in many ways the natural bedfellow of the proponent 
of the physical-symbol-system hypothesis.  For the physical-symbol-system hypothesis 
claims that what is essential to intelligence and thought is a certain capacity to manipulate 
symbols.  This puts the essence of thought at a level independent of the physical stuff out of 
which the thinking system is constructed.  Get the symbol manipulating capacities right and 
the stuff does not matter.  As the well-known blues number has it, "It ain't the meat, it's the 
motion." The philosophical doctrine of functionalism echoes this sentiment, asserting (in a 
variety of forms) that mental states are to be identified not with, say, physicochemical 
states of a being but with more abstract organizational, structural, or informational 
properties.  In Putnam's rousing words 'We could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't 
matter" (1975), p. 291).  Aristotle, some would have it, may have been the first philo-
sophical functionalist.  Though there seems to be a backlash now underway (see, e.g., 
Churchland (1981), and Churchland (1986)), the recent popularity of the doctrine can be 
traced to the efforts of Hilary Putnam (1960) (1967), Jerry Fodor (1968), David Armstrong 
(1970) and, in a slightly different vein, Daniel Dennett (1981) and William Lycan (1981). I 
shall not attempt to do justice to the nuances of these positions here.  Instead, I shall simply 
characterize the most basic and still influential form of the doctrine. First though, a 
comment on the question to which functionalism is the putative answer. 
It is useful to distinguish the various explanatory projects for which ideas about the 
mind are put forward. Thus note that the classical philosophical project has been to 
formulate and assess schemas for a substantial theory of the essence of the mental.  The 
notion of essence here may be unpacked as the search for the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being in some mental state.  In this restricted sense a theory of mind should 




                                                
mental state (e.g., believing it is about to rain, feeling sad, feeling anxious, suffering a 
stabbing pain in the left toe, and so forth). 
For the moment let me simply assert that Newell and Simon's intended project (in 
common with a lot of workers in AI) is psychological explanation.  Pending a fuller 
account of psychological explanation, it is not obvious that the project of psychological 
explanation is identical with the project of seeking the essence of the mental in the sense 
just sketched. But Newell & Simon's talk of the physical-symbol-system hypothesis as an 
account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of intelligent action effectively identifies 
the tasks.  It follows that having a full psychological explanation in their sense would put 
you in a position to re-create or instantiate the analyzed mental state in a machine (barring 
practical difficulties). I elsewhere argue for a firm distinction between these projects of 
psychological explanation and psychological instantiation6. 
 
6 See Clark (1989), ch. 10. 
Functionalism, then, is a sketch or schema of the kind of theory that, when filled in, 
will tell us in a very deep sense what it is to be in some mental state.  The most basic form 
of such a theory is known as Turing machine functionalism.  Not surprisingly, the doctrine 
takes its cue from Turing's conception of the formal properties sufficient to guarantee that a 
task is computable by a mechanism regardless of the physical stuff out of which the 
mechanism was made (see section 2 above). 
In Putnam's hands (1960) (1967) functionalism came to suggest a theory of mind (in 
the sense of a schema for a substantial theory of the essence of the mental) that was 




Very sketchily, the situation was something like this.  Dualism (the idea that mind is a 
ghostly kind of nonmaterial substance) had been discredited as nonexplanatory mysticism 
and was briefly displaced by behaviorism.  Behaviorism (Ryle (1949) held that mental 
states were identical with sets of actual and counterfactual overt behaviors and that inner 
states of the subject, though no doubt causally implicated in such behaviors, were not 
theoretically important to understanding what it is to be in certain mental states. 
This dismissal of the importance of internal states (for a philosophical theory of. 
mind) was resisted by the first wave of identity theories who claimed that mental states 
were identical with brain processes (Smart (1959)).  But the identity theory, if one took the 
claims of its proponents rather literally (more literally, I am inclined to think, than they 
ever intended) lay open to a variety of criticisms.  Especially relevant here is Putnam's 
(1960) (1967) criticism that identity theory makes far too tight the tie between being in a 
certain mental state (e.g., feeling pain) and being in a certain physicochemical or neural 
state.  For on an extreme, type-type-identity reading, the identity of some mental state with, 
say, some neural state would seem to imply that a being incapable of being in that neural 
state could not, in principle, be in the mental state in question.  But for rather obvious 
reasons, this was deemed unacceptable.  A creature lacking neurons would be unable to 
occupy any neural state.  But couldn't there be exotic beings made of other stuff who were 
nonetheless capable of sharing our beliefs, desires, and feelings? If we allow this seemingly 
sensible possibility then we, as philosophers, need some account of what physically 
variously constituted feelers and believers have in common that makes them feelers and 
believers.  Behaviorism would have done the trick but its denial of the importance of inner 
states had been perceived as a fault.  Identity theory, it seemed, had gone too far in the 
other direction. 
Between the Scylla and the Charybdis sailed the good ship functionalism.  What is 




in a certain abstract functional state.  And that functional state is defined over two 
components:  (1) the role of some internal states in mediating system input and system 
output (the behavior element) and (2) the role of the states or processes in activating or 
otherwise affecting other internal states of the system (the inner element).  If we also 
presume that cognition is a computational phenomenon, then we can link this 
characterization (as Putnam [1960] did) to the notion of a Turing machine, which is defined 
by its input and output and its internal state transition profile.  What Turing machine you 
are instantiating, not what substance you are made of, characterizes your mental states.  As 
I said, it ain't the meat, it's the motions. 
7. FUNCTIONALISM AND THE FORMAL SHADOWS OF MIND. 
Now the bad news.  Functionalism has had its problems. One charge is that of excessive 
liberalism (see Block (1980)). The worry is that Turing-machine functionalism allows too 
many kinds of things to be possible believers and thinkers.  For example, it might in prin-
ciple be possible to get the population of China to pass messages (letters, values, whatever) 
between themselves so as briefly to realize the functional specification of some mental state 
(Block (1980), p. 276-278). (Recall. it is only a matter of correctly organizing inputs, 
outputs, and internal state transitions, and these, however they are specified, won=t be tied 
to any particular kind of organism.) As Block (1980), p. 277) puts it, "In describing the 
Chinese system as a Turing machine I have drawn the line [i.e., specified what counts as 
inputs and outputs] in such a way that it satisfies a certain type of functional description-
one that you also satisfy, and one that, according to functionalism, justifies attributions of 
mentality." But, says Block, there is at least prima facie reason to doubt that such a system 
could have any mental states at all. Could that overall system really constitute say, an agent 
in pain? Surely not. Surely there is nothing which it is like, either nice or nasty, to be such a 




system has no qualia (raw feels, real subjectivity). Hence Block dubs this argument the 
absent-qualia argument. 
Another worry is that typical functional/cognitivist models capture not the real 
essence so much as the shallow formal shadows of mind. In a series of influential 
publications (1980, 1983, 1984) John Searle has established himself as a leading opponent 
of the information-theoretic approach to mind.  That approach, he thinks, is just tilting at 
the "formal shadows" of mind.  But in contrast, real mentality, he says, depends on far 
wetter things, namely, on the physicochemical properties of human brains.  Searle's 
criticism is targeted on what he calls "the hypothesis of strong AI." This is defined as the 
claim that "the appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states and that 
the programs thereby explain human cognition" (Searle (1980), p. 283).  The attack begins 
with a now infamous thought experiment, the puzzling case of the Chinese room.  This 
thought experiment aims to provide a general critique of the computational approach to 
mind.  Its starting point is a specific program that might seem to simulate the intentional 
activity of understanding a story (Schank & Abelson (1977)).  Very briefly, the program 
provides the computer with some background data concerning the topic of a story to be 
presented.  The computer can then be given a story on this topic and afterward it will 
answer questions about the story that are not explicitly resolved in the story itself.  Thus, to 
use Searle's example, we might program in background data on human behavior in 
restaurants.  We may then tell the story of a man who enters a restaurant, orders a 
hamburger, and upon leaving, presents the waitress with a big tip.  If the computer is then 
asked, “And did the man eat the hamburger?”  it can answer "yes,” because it apparently 
knows about restaurants.  Searle believes, I think rightly, that the computer running this 
program does not really know about restaurants at all, at least if by "know" we mean 




onstrate this.  But Searle believes his arguments against that sort of computational model of 
understanding are also arguments against any computational model of understanding. 
We are asked to imagine a human agent, an English monolinguist, placed m a large 
room and given a batch of papers with various symbols on it. These symbols, which to him 
are just meaningless squiggles identifiable only by shape, are in fact the ideograms of the 
Chinese script. A second batch of papers arrives, again full of ideograms. Along with it 
there arrives a set of instructions in English for correlating the two batches.  Finally, a third 
batch of papers arrives bearing still further arrangements of the same uninterpreted formal 
symbols and again accompanied by some instructions in English concerning the correlation 
of this batch with its predecessors.  The human agent performs the required matchings and 
issues the result, which I shall call "the response," This painstaking activity, Searle argues, 
corresponds to the activity of a computer running Schank's program.  For we may think of 
batch 3 as the questions, batch 2 as the story, and batch 1 as the script or background data.  
The response, Searle says, may be so convincing as to be indistinguishable from that of a 
true Chinese speaker.  And yet, and this is the essential point, the human agent performing 
the correlations understands no Chinese, just as, it would now appear, a computer running 
Schank's program understands no stories. In each case what is going on is the mere 
processing of information.  If the intuitions prompted by the Chinese-room example are 
correct, understanding must involve something extra.  From this Searle concludes that no 
computer can ever understand merely by "performing computational operations on formally 
specified elements." Nor, consequently, can the programs that determine such 
computational operations tell us anything about the special nature of mind (Searle (1980), 
p. 286). 
Ramming the point home, Searle asks us to compare the understanding we (as 
ordinary English speakers) have of a story in English against the "understanding" the 




Searle argues, no contest. “In the Chinese case I have everything that Artificial Intelligence 
can put into me by way of a program and I understand nothing; in the English case I under-
stand everything and there is so far no reason at all to suppose that my understanding has 
anything to do with computer programs -- i.e., with computational operations on purely 
formally specified elements" (Searle (1980), p. 286).  In short, no formal account can be 
sufficient for understanding, since "a human will be able to follow the formal principles 
without understanding anything" (p. 287).  And there is no obvious reason to think that 
satisfying some formal condition is necessary either, though as Searle admits, this could 
(just conceivably) yet prove to be the case.  The formal descriptions, Searle thinks (p. 299), 
seem to be capturing just the shadows of mind, shadows thrown not by abstract 
computational sequences but by the actual operation of the physical stuff of the brain. 
I shall argue that Searle is simply wrong thus completely to shift the emphasis away 
from formal principles on the basis of a demonstration that the operation of a certain kind 
of formal program is insufficient for intentionality.  The position to be developed below 
(and in much more detail in Clark (1989)) focuses instead on the instantiation of a certain 
kind of formal description that is far more microstructural than the descriptions of the SPSS 
hypothesis. Undermining Searle=s strongest claims, however, is no simple matter, and we 
must proceed cautiously. The best strategy is to look  a little more closely at the positive 
claims about the importance of the nonformal, biological, stuff. 
8. SHOWING WHAT WE'RE MADE OF. 
Searle considers several possible replies to his paper, only one of which need interest us 
here. It is what he calls the brain-simulator reply, and it goes like this.  Suppose a program 
modeled the formal structure of actual Chinese brains engaged in understanding Chinese.  
Surely then it would constitute a genuine Chinese understanding.  At this point, to his 
credit, Searle grasps the nettle. "No," he says, "we could imagine an elaborate set of water 




would the understanding of Chinese reside? Surely the answer is >nowhere=@ (adapted 
from Searle (1980), p. 295). (This argument should recall the worries about excessive 
liberalism and absent qualia, which had functionalism in a vicelike grip.) Regarding the 
brain simulator then, Searle is in no doubt: "As long as it simulates only the formal 
structure of the sequence of neuron firings at the synapses, it won't have simulated what 
matters about the brain, namely its causal properties, its ability to produce intentional 
states" (Searle (1980), p. 295). Or again: "What matters about brain operation is not the 
formal shadow cast by the sequence of synapses but rather the actual properties of the 
sequences" (Searle (1980), p. 300). 
The allusions to causal powers have struck many critics as unforgivably obscure.  It 
is hard to see why.  Searle's claim has two components: (1) The formal properties of the 
brain do not constitute intentionality. (2) the reason they do not constitute it is that only 
certain kinds of stuff can support thought.  Well, (1) may be right (see Clark (1989), ch. 3), 
though not for the reasons cited in (2).  But even so, (2) is surely not that obscure a claim.  
Searle cites the less puzzling case of photosynthesis.  By focusing on this, we may begin to 
unscramble the chaos. 
Photosynthesis, Searle suggests, is a phenomenon dependent on the actual causal 
properties of certain substances.  Chlorophyl is an earthly example.  But perhaps other 
substances found elsewhere in the universe can photosynthesize too.  Similarly, Martians 
might have intentionality, even though (poor souls) their brains are made of different stuff 
from our own.  Suppose we now take a formal chemical theory of how photosynthesis 
occurs.  A computer could then work through the formal description.  But would actual 
photosynthesis thereby take place? No, it's the wrong stuff, you see.  The formal 
description is doubtless a handy thing to have.  But if it's energy (or thought) you need, you 
had better go for the real stuff.  In its way, this is fair enough.  A gross formal theory of 




                                                
energy." A fine-grained formal theory might take us through a series of  microchemical 
descriptions in which various substances combine and cause various effects.  Gross or fine-
grained, neither formalism seems to herald the arrival of the silicon tulip.  Market 
gardening has nothing to fear from simulated gardening as yet. 
Now, there are properties of plants that are irrelevant to their photosynthetic 
capacities, e.g., the color of blooms, the shape of leaves (within limits) the height off the 
ground, and so on.  The questions to ask are: What do the chemical properties buy for the 
plant, and what are the properties of the chemicals by which they buy it? The human brain 
is made out of a certain physical, chemical stuff.  And perhaps in conjunction with other 
factors, that stuff buys us thought, just as the plants stuff buys it energy.  So, what are the 
properties of the physical chemical stuff of the brain that buy us thought? Here is one 
answer (not Searle's or that of supporters of Searle's emphasis on stuff, e.g., Maloney 
[1987]): the vast structural variability in response to incoming exogenous and endogenous 
stimuli that the stuff in that arrangement provides7. 
 
7 I am indebted to Aron Sloman for teaching me to put this point in terms of structural 
variability. 
Suppose this were so.  Might it not also be true that satisfying some kinds of formal 
description guaranteed the requisite structural variability and that satisfying other kinds of 
formal description did not? Such a state of affairs seems not only possible but pretty well 
inevitable.  But if so, Searle's argument against the formal approach is, to say the least, 




buy it structural variability, which in turn buys it the capacity to sustain thought, is the 
Chinese-room thought experiment.  But in that example the formal description was at a 
very gross level, in line with the SPSS hypothesis which in this case amounts to rules for 
correlating inputs, corresponding to sentences of Chinese, with similar outputs.  It could 
well be that a system capable of satisfying that level of formal description need not possess 
the vast structural variability by which (on my hypothesis) the brain supports thought.  This 
could be neatly tied in with Dreyfus's (1972) (1981) observations that implementations of 
conventional cognitivist programs are inflexible and lack common sense.  Such programs 
do not depend on a suitably variable and flexible substructure and hence fail to instantiate 
any understanding whatsoever. (If this talk about suitably variable and flexible 
substructures seems mysterious, it should become less so once we look at new kinds of 
computational models of mind: connectionist or PDP models.) 
But it might yet prove to be the case that formal descriptions at a lower, more 
microstructural level will have only instantiations that must constitute a system with the 
requisite structural variability.  And as long as this possibility remains, the case for the 
importance of stuff is far from watertight.  Moreover, as we shall see, cognitive science is 
just beginning to develop formal, microstructural theories that fit this general bill. The price 
of this maneuver is, of course, grasping Searle's nettle at the other end.  If a set of pipes 
really did constitute a system with the requisite structural variability, then (subject, perhaps, 
to a few further stipulations) we should welcome it as a fellow thinker. I am ecumenical 
enough to do this.  The more so since, I am reasonably convinced, it is at least physically 
impossible to secure the relevant variability out of such parts in the actual universe.  If 
there are possible worlds subject to different physical laws than our own and if in those 
worlds collections of pipes, beer cans or whatever exhibit the relevant fine-grained formal 




of relaxation, graceful degradation, generalization, and so on), we should bear them no ill 
will. Some beer cans, it seems, satisfy formal descriptions that our beer cans cannot reach. 
9. MICROFUNCTIONALISM. 
The defense of a formal approach to mind mooted above can easily be extended to a 
defense of a form of functionalism against the attacks mounted by Block. An unsurprising 
result, since Searle's attack on strong AI is intended to cast doubt on any purely formal 
account of mind, and that attack, as we saw, bears a striking resemblance to the charges of 
excessive liberalism and absent qualia raised by Block.  Functionalism, recall, identified 
the real essence of a mental state with an input, internal state transition, and output profile.  
Any system with the right profile, regardless of its size, nature and components, would 
occupy the mental state in question.  But unpromising systems (like the population of 
China) could, it seemed, be so organized.  Such excessive liberalism seemed to undermine 
functionalism -- surely the system comprising the population of China would not itself be a 
proper subject of experience.  The qualia (subjective experience or feels) seem to be 
nowhere present. 
It is now open to us to respond to this charge in the same way we just responded to 
Searle.  It all depends, we may say, on where you locate the grain of the input, internal state 
transitions, and output.  If you locate it at the gross level of a semantically transparent 
system, then we may indeed doubt that satisfying that formal description is a step on the 
road to being a proper subject of experience.  At that level we may expect absent qualia, 
excessive liberalism, and all the rest. But suppose our profile is much finer-grained and is 
far removed from descriptions of events in everyday language, perhaps with internal-state 
transitions specified in a mathematical formalism rather than in a directly semantically 
interpretable formalism.  Then it is by no means so obvious (if it ever was -- see 
Churchland & Churchland (1981)) either that a system made up of the population of China 




mental ascriptions at issue (other circumstances permitting).  My suggestion is that we 
might reasonably bet on a kind of microfunctionalism, relative to which our intuitions about 
excessive liberalism and absent qualia would show up as more clearly unreliable. 
Such a position owes something to Lycan's (1981) defense of functionalism against 
Block. In that defense he accuses Block of relying on a kind of gestalt blindness (Lycan's 
term) in which the functional components are made so large (e.g., whole Chinese speakers) 
or unlikely (e.g., Searle's beer cans) that we rebel at the thought of ascribing intentionality 
to the giant systems they comprise.  Supersmall beings might, of course, have the same 
trouble with neurons.  Lycan, however, then opts for what he calls a homuncular 
functionalism, in which the functional subsystems are identified by whatever they may be 
said to do for the agent. 
Microfunctionalism, by contrast, would describe at least the internal functional 
profile of the system (the internal state transitions) in terms far removed from such 
contentful, purposive characterizations.  It would delineate formal (probably mathematical) 
relations between processing units in such a way that when those mathematical relations 
obtain, the system will be capable of vast, flexible structural variability and will have the 
attendant emergent properties.  By keeping the formal characterization (and thereby any 
good semantic interpretation of the formal characterization) at this fine-grained level we 
may hope to guarantee that any instantiation of such a description provides at least 
potentially the right kind of substructure to support the kind of flexible, rich behavior 
patterns required for true understanding. These idea about substructure are fleshed out a 
little in the next section and in detail in Clark (1989) (1993). 
Whether such an account is properly termed a species of functionalism, as I've 
suggested, is open to some debate.  I have opted for a broad notion of functionalism that 
relates the real essence of thought and intentionality to patterns of nonphysically specified 




kind of way.  This in effect identifies functionalism with the claim that structure, not the 
stuff, counts and hence identifies it with any formal approach to mind.  On that picture, 
microfunctionalism is, as its name suggests, just a form of functionalism, one that specifies 
internal state transitions at a very fine-grained level. 
Some philosophers, however, might prefer to restrict the "functionalism" label to 
just those accounts in which (1) we begin by formulating, for each individual mental state, 
a profile of input, internal state transitions, and output in which internal state transitions are 
described at the level of beliefs, desires, and other mental states of folk psychology, (2) we 
then replace the folk-psychological specifications by some formal, nonsemantic 
specification that preserves the boundaries of the folk-psychological specifications. Now 
there. is absolutely no guarantee that such boundaries will be preserved in a 
microfunctionalist account. Moreover, though it may, microfunctionalism need not aspire 
to give a functional specification of each type of mental state. (How many are there 
anyway?) Instead, it might give an account of the kind of substructure needed to support 
general, flexible behavior of a kind that makes appropriate the ascription to the agent of a 
whole host of folk-psychological states.  For these reasons, it may be wise to treat "micro-
functionalism" as a term of art and the defense of functionalism as a defense of the possible 
value of a fine-grained formal approach to mind.  I use the terminology I do because I 
believe the essential motivation of functionalism lies in the claim that what counts is the 
structure, not the stuff (this is consistent with its roots -- see Putnam (1960) (1967) 
(1975b)).  But who wants to fight over a word? Philosophical disquiet over classical 
cognitivism, I conclude, has largely been well motivated but at times overambitious. Block 
and Searle, for example, both raise genuine worries about the kind of theories that seek to 
explain mind by detailing computational manipulations of standard symbolic atoms.  But it 
is by no means obvious that criticisms that make sense relative to those kinds of 




that structure, not stuff, is what counts has life beyond its classical cognitivist incarnation, 
as we shall next see. 
10. SYMBOLIC FLEXIBILITY. 
Smolensky (1987) (1988) usefully describes connectionist or PDP models as working in 
what he calls the subsymbolic paradigm. In the subsymbolic paradigm, cognition is not 
modeled by the manipulation of machine states that neatly match (or stand for) our daily, 
symbolic descriptions of mental states and processes. Rather, these high-level descriptions 
(he cites goals, concepts, knowledge, perceptions, beliefs, schemata, inferences, actions) 
turn out to be useful labels that bear only approximate relations to the underlying 
computational structure.  He argues that work in the subsymbolic (or distributed 
connectionist) paradigm aims to do justice to the "real data on human intelligent 
performance," i.e., to clinical and experimental results, while settling for merely emergent 
approximations to our high-level descriptive categories.  The essential difference between 
the subsymbolic and the symbolic approach, as Smolensky paints it, concerns the question, 
Are the semantically interpretable entities the very same objects as those governed by the 
rules of computational manipulation that define the system?  
In the symbolic paradigm, the answer is yes.  Consider the STS approach we 
sketched back in section 5. Here we find computational operations directly applied to high-
level descriptions of mental states presented as a means of capturing the computational 
backdrop of mind.  Thus, we might find a model of scientific discovery in which operations 
are performed on states directly interpretable as standing for particular hypotheses 
concerning the laws governing some data.  Against this kind of approach, the subsymbolic 
theorist urges that the entities whose behavior is governed by the rules of computational 
manipulation that define the system need not share the semantics of the task description.  




                                                
network8. And in a highly distributed model these units in the end will have no individual 
semantic interpretation, or at least none that maps neatly and projectibly onto our ordinary 
concepts of the entities to be treated in a model of the processing involved.  Rather, what 
gets semantically interpreted will be general patterns of activation of such units.  A single 
high-level concept like that of a kitchen or a ball may thus be associated with a continuum 
of activation patterns corresponding to the subtly different ideas about kitchen or ball that 
we entertain in various circumstances.  Smolensky puts it nicely in the following passage: 
In the symbolic approach, symbols (atoms) are used to denote the semantically 
interpretable entities (concepts).  These same symbols are the objects governed by 
symbol manipulations in the rules which define the system.  The entities which are 
capable of being semantically interpreted are also the entities governed by the 
formal laws that define the system.  In the subsymbolic paradigm, this is no longer 
true.  The semantically interpreted entities are patterns of activation over a large 
number of units in the system, whereas the entities manipulated by formal rules are 
the individual activations of cells in the network.  The rules take the form of 
activation passing rules, of essentially different character from symbol manipulation 
rules. (1978), p. 100) 
 
8 For an introduction to connectionist models, see e.g., Clark (1989) (1993), Smolensky 
(1988). 
The claim, in effect, is that PDP systems need not (and typically will not) be semantically 




plausible for the following reason.  A system will count as semantically transparent just in 
case the entities found in a top-level task analysis of what the system does have neat 
syntactic analogues whose behavior is governed by the computational rules (explicit or 
tacit) of the system.  Now clearly, it will not do to say that just because individual units 
cannot be treated as the syntactic analogues of such entities (e.g, as "coffee," "ball," 
"kitchen," and so on) the condition fails to be met.  For why not treat patterns of activation 
of such units as the required analogues? The behavior of such patterns surely is governed 
by the computational rules of the system. 
This is where the requirement that such analogues be projectible comes in.  
Consider a sentence like "the ball broke the window." A conventional AI system dealing 
with such a sentence will have a syntactic analogue (first in, say, LISP and hence down to 
machine code) for "ball" and "window." Consider now a connectionist representation (such 
as that developed in McClelland & Kawamoto (1986)) of the same sentence.  There will be 
a pattern of active units, and it may well be possible to nonarbitrarily isolate a subset of that 
pattern that, we would like to say, stands for "ball".  But that subpattern, it is important to 
note, will vary from context to context.  "Ball" as it occurs in "The ball broke the window@ 
will have a different (though doubtless partially overlapping) syntactic analogue to "ball" as 
it occurs in "the baby held the ball." In one case, hardness related "microfeatures" will be 
active.  In the other case, not.  Thus, although in each individual case we can isolate a 
connectionist syntactic analogue for the entities spoken of in a conceptual account, these 
entities will not be neatly projectible, i.e., the same syntactic entity will not continue to 
correlate in other cases with the top-level semantic entity.  This is the real sense in which 
PDP systems can constitute a move away from semantic transparency. 
Examples could be multiplied.  Smolensky (1988) makes similar comments about 




then, is that "the context [in PDP systems] alters the internal structure of the symbol: the 
activities of the sub-conceptual units that comprise the symbol -- its subsymbols -- change 
across contexts@ (Smolensky (1988), p. 17). Smolensky formalizes this point as a 
characteristic of the highly distributed PDP systems he is interested in as follows: "In the 
symbolic paradigm the context of a symbol is manifest around it and consists of other 
symbols; in the subsymbolic paradigm the context of a symbol is manifest inside it, and 
consists of subsymbols" (Smolensky (1988), p. 17).  Both the intrinsic holism and 
flexibility of PDP systems can be seen to flow from this fact. 
11. GRADES OF SEMANTIC TRANSPARENCY. 
Using this apparatus as a base, Smolensky (1988) formulates an interesting picture of the 
cognitive terrain.  He suggests that some human knowledge (e.g., public scientific 
knowledge) exists in the first instance as linguistic items such as the principle "energy is 
conserved." Human beings, he suggests, may use such knowledge by deploying a virtual 
machine adapted to manipulate analogues of such linguistic representations.  Such 
explicitly formulated knowledge he calls "cultural knowledge." The "top-level conscious 
processors@ of an individual is precisely, he argues, a virtual machine adapted to that end.  
This machine, which is realized by a PDP substructure, he calls the "conscious rule 
interpreter." It is contrasted with what he calls the "intuitive processor." The distinction 
again depends on the kind of entities processed.  The conscious rule interpreter actually 
takes as its syntactic objects the semantic entities we use in describing the task domain 
(e.g., "energy").  The intuitive processor, by contrast, takes as its objects distributed 
microfeatural representations. These representations, we saw, bear only a fluid and shifting 
relationship to the semantic entities (like "coffee" and "ball") spoken of at the conceptual 
level.  It thus follows that the programs running on the conscious rule interpreter have a 
syntax and semantics comparable to our top-level articulation of the domain. (This is no 




running on the intuitive processor do not.  In my terminology, programs running on the 
conscious rule interpreter will be semantically transparent, and the semantics will seep 
neatly down to the formal level, while those running on the intuitive processor will not.  
The intuitive processor is quite clearly to be seen as the more evolutionarily basic of the 
two and is responsible (he says) for all animal behavior and much human behavior, 
including: "perception, practiced motor behavior, fluent linguistic behavior, intuition in 
problem solving and game-playing. In short, practically all of skilled performance" 
(Smolensky (1988), p.5). 
There need not, however, be an all-or-nothing divide between the semantically 
transparent processing of the conscious rule interpreter and the semantically opaque 
processing of the intuitive processor.  For the cognitive system itself is presumed to be at 
root a subsymbolic system that, to a greater or lesser degree in various cases, approximates 
to the behavior of a symbolic system manipulating conceptual entities.  The greater the so-
called dimension shift between the conceptual description and the semantic interpretation 
of the in the network, the rougher such an approximation becomes. 
Another route to the approximation claim is to regard the classical accounts as 
describing the competence of a system, i.e., its capacity to solve a certain range of well-
posed problems (see Smolensky (1988), p. 19).  In idealized conditions (sufficient input 
data, unlimited processing time) the PDP system will match the behavior specified by the 
competence theory. But outside that idealized domain of well-posed problems and limitless 
processing time, the performance of a PDP system will diverge from the predictions of the 
competence theory in a pleasing way.  It will give sensible responses even on receipt of 
degraded data or under severe time constraints.  This is because although describable in 
that idealized case as satisfying hard constraints, the system may actually operate by 
satisfying a multitude of soft constraints.  Smolensky here introduces an analogy with 




under certain conditions.  Likewise with the cognitive system.  It looks increasingly 
classical as we approach the level of conscious rule following.  But in fact, according to 
Smolensky, it is a PDP system through and through. 
In the same spirit Rumelhart and McClelland suggest: 'It might be argued that 
conventional symbol processing models are macroscopic accounts, analogous to Newtonian 
mechanics, whereas our models offer more microscopic accounts, analogous to quantum 
theory.... Through a thorough understanding of the relationship between the Newtonian 
mechanics and quantum theory we can understand that the macroscopic level of description 
may be only an approximation to the more microscopic theory" (Rumelhart & McClelland 
(1986), p. 125).  To illustrate this point, consider a simple example due to Paul Smolensky.  
Imagine that the cognitive task to be modeled involves answering qualitative questions on 
the behavior of a particular electrical circuit. (The restriction to a single circuit may appall 
classicists, although it is defended by Smolensky on the grounds that a small number of 
such representations may act as the chunks utilized in general purpose expertise -- see 
Smolensky (1986), p. 241.) Given a description of the circuit, an expert can answer 
questions like "If we increase the resistance at a certain point, what effect will that have on 
the voltage, i.e., will the voltage increase, decrease, or remain the same?" 
Suppose, as seems likely, that a high-level competence-theoretic specification of the 
information to be drawn on by an algorithm tailored to answer this question cites various 
laws of circuitry in its derivations (what Smolensky refers to as the Ahard laws@ of 
circuitry: Ohm's law and Kirchoffs' law).  For example, derivations involving Ohm's law 
would invoke the equation 
voltage = current x resistance. 
How does this description relate to the actual processing of the system? The model 
represents the state of the circuit by a pattern of activity over a set of feature units.  These 




encode whether the overall voltage falls, rises, or remains the same when the resistance at a 
certain point goes up.  These feature units are connected to a set of what Smolensky calls 
"knowledge atoms," which represent patterns of activity across subsets of the featured 
units. These in fact encode the legal combinations of feature states allowed by the actual 
laws of circuitry.  Thus, for example, "the system's knowledge of Ohm's law ... is 
distributed over the many knowledge atoms whose subpattems encode the legal feature 
combinations for current, voltage and resistance" (Smolensky (1988), p. 19).  In short, there 
is a subpattern for every legal combination of qualitative changes (65 subpatterns, or 
knowledge atoms, for the circuit in question). 
At first sight, it might seem that the system is merely a units-and connections 
implementation of a lookup table.  But that is not so.  In fact, connectionist networks act as 
lookup tables only when they are provided with an overabundance of hidden units and 
hence can simply memorize input-output pairings.  By contrast, the system in question 
encodes what Smolensky terms "soft constraints," i.e., patterns of relations that usually 
obtain between the various feature units (microfeatures).  It thus has general knowledge of 
qualitative relations among circuit microfeatures.  But it does not have the general 
knowledge encapsulated in hard constraints like Ohm's law.  The soft constraints are two-
way connections between feature units and knowledge atoms, which incline the network 
one way or another but do not compel it, that is, they can be overwhelmed by the activity of 
other units (that's why they are soft).  And as in all connectionist networks, the system 
computes by trying simultaneously to satisfy as many of these soft constraints as it can.  To 
see that it is not a mere lookup tree of legal combinations, we need only note that it is 
capable of giving sensible answers to (inconsistent or incomplete) questions that have no 
answer in a simple lookup table of legal combinations. 
The soft constraints are numerically encoded as weighted inter-unit connection 




which is a microdecision based on formal numerical rules and numerical computations" 
(Smolensky (1986), p. 246). 
The network has two properties of special interest to us.  First, it can be shown that 
if it is given a well-posed problem and unlimited processing time, it will always give the 
correct answer as predicted by the hard laws of circuitry.  But, as already remarked, it is by 
no means bound by such laws.  Give it an ill-posed or inconsistent problem, and it will 
satisfy as many as it can of the soft constraints (which are all it really knows about). Thus 
"outside of the idealized domain of well-posed problems and unlimited processing time, the 
system gives sensible performance" (Smolensky (1988), p. 19).  The hard rules (Ohm's law, 
etc.) can thus be viewed as an external theorist's characterization of an idealized subset of 
its actual performance (it is no accident if this brings to mind some of Dennett's claims 
about the intentional stance -- see Dennett (1981)). 
Second, the network exhibits interesting serial behavior as it repeatedly tries to 
satisfy all the soft constraints.  This serial behavior is characterized by Smolensky as a set 
of macrodecisions each of which amounts to a "commitment of part of the network to a 
portion of the solution." These macrodecisions, Smolensky notes, are "approximately like 
the firing of production rules. In fact, these 'productions' fire in essentially the same order 
as in a symbolic forward-chaining inference system" (Smolensky (1988), p. 19).  Thus, the 
network will look as if it is sensitive to hard, symbolic rule at quite a fine grain of 
description.  It will not simply solve the problem "in extension" as if it knew hard rules.  
Even the stages of problem solving may look as if they are caused by the system's running 
a processing analogue of the steps in the symbolic derivations available in the competence 
theory. 
But the appearance is an illusion.  The system has no knowledge of the objects 
mentioned in the hard rules.  For example, there is no neat subpattern of units that can be 




sets of units stand for resistance at R1, and other sets for resistance at R2. In more complex 
networks the coalitions of units that, when active, stand in for a top-level concept like 
resistance are highly context-sensitive. That is, they vary according to context of 
occurrence. Thus to use Smolensky's own example, the representation of coffee in such a 
network would not consist of a single recurrent syntactic item but a coalition of smaller 
items (microfeatures) that shift according to context.  Coffee in the context of a cup may be 
represented by a coalition that includes the features (liquid) and (contacting-porcelain).  
Coffee in the context of jar may include the features (granule) and (contacting-glass).  
There is thus only an "approximate equivalence of the 'coffee vectors' across contexts," 
unlike the "exact equivalence of the coffee tokens across different contexts in a symbolic 
processing system" (Smolensky (1988), p. 17).  By thus replacing the conceptual symbol 
"coffee" with a shifting coalition of microfeatures, the so-called dimension shift, such 
systems deprive themselves of the structured mental representations deployed in both a 
classical competence theory and a classical symbol processing account (level 2).  Likewise, 
in the simple network described, there is no stable representation that stands for resistance.  
It seems, then, that by treating subsymbolically the entities spoken of in our 
conceptual-level descriptions, we buy the flexibility, shading, and general lack of rigidity 
and brittleness required of a system if its subsequent behavior is ever to warrant the 
ascription too it of a genuine grasp of concepts. Symbolic flexibility of understanding is 
brought about by the increased low-level variability of the PDP approach. In this way such 
systems may avoid the excessive rigidity and lack of insight endemic to conventional AI. 
Notice also that subsymbolic models remain formal in the sense outlined in sections 1 
through 6, and that this is a microfunctionalist theory as defined in section 9. That is, it 
specifies a system only in terms of input-output profiles for individual units and thus is not 




                                                
formal profile do not correspond to, or otherwise nearly preserve, the boundaries of any 
conceptual-level description of thought. 
12. CONCLUSIONS. 
Connectionism, I have tried to show, is an existence proof of the possibility of a kind of 
microfunctionalist approach to understanding the mind. Connectionism remains committed 
to the basic formalist belief that a certain syntactic organization is sufficient for mentality. 
But it describes that formal organization in a much finer-grained way than (most) 
traditional AI. In particular, it does not bind its syntactic elements directly to the conceptual 
items characteristic of conscious thought and its linguistic expressions. Such an approach, I 
now believe9, needs to be combined with a better appreciation of the way bodily dynamics, 
motion, and environment-manipulating action alter and transform the problem-spaces that 
confront biological brains. Cognition and mind are then best understood by further pursing 
the microfunctionalist approach in the special contexts of robotics, autonomous agent 
theory, and neuroethology10. 
 
9 See Clark (1997). 
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